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In 1971, Washington enacted the State Environmental Policy
Act1 (SEPA), thereby announcing its recognition of "the necessary
harmony between humans and the environment in order to prevent
and eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere, as well as to
promote the welfare of humans and the understanding of our ecologi-
cal systems."2 To implement this policy, SEPA requires agencies to
gather relevant information and engage in an open and public study of
"probable significant, adverse" environmental impacts for all "propos-
als for legislation and other major actions."3 Procedurally, SEPA re-
quires agencies to make a threshold determination of whether the pro-
ject is likely to significantly affect the environment and, where such
impacts are likely, to produce an environmental impact statement
(EIS).4
One problem faced in implementing the goals of SEPA is the
practice of "piecemealing." Defined broadly, piecemealing is a
method of circumventing SEPA's informational mandate by dividing
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1. WASH. REV. CODE Ch. 43.21C (2000).
2. Stempel v. Dep't of Water Res., 82 Wash. 2d 109, 117, 508 P.2d 166, 171 (1973).
3. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.031 (2000).
4. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-330 (2001).
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a proposal into pieces and separately studying their adverse impacts.5
In such cases, the environmental impacts of each individual part may
appear negligible, and so comprehensive environmental review ap-
pears unwarranted even though the proposal as a whole may have a
significant impact on the environment.' Piecemealing may occur in
the context of a physical project, such as the segmentation of a con-
struction proposal into several small, insignificant actions.' It may
also occur over time, when environmental review is conducted only on
current segments of a project, and review of later segments is post-
poned until they actually begin construction.8 Under either scenario,
the danger of piecemealed review is that "the later environmental re-
view often seems merely a formality, as the construction of the later
segments of the project has already been mandated by the earlier con-
struction."9
Piecemealing detracts from the informational goals of SEPA, as
codified in its legislative and regulatory mandates."0 Both state and
federal courts have disapproved of piecemeal review whenever they
have successfully identified it." Therefore, one would expect that the
problem of piecemealed review should not exist. However, the courts
have been inconsistent in their treatment of piecemeal review, particu-
larly where the project under review seems to indicate few environ-
mental concerns on its own. Because of this uncertainty, environ-
mental advocates continue to raise the SEPA flag in response to
allegedly improper "phased" and "tiered" environmental studies 2
while agencies and courts struggle over, and often simply ignore, the
piecemeal problem.1 3 As a consequence, the rural and natural land-
5. See Juanita Bay Valley Cmty. Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wash. App. 59, 72, 510 P.2d
1140, 1149 (1973).
6. See Id.
7. See, e.g., Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas
Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that an agency acted appropriately when
it fragmented highway study into three parts, rendering outside portions exempt from NEPA
because the size of each individually failed to qualify as a "major federal action").
8. Concerned Taxpayers Opposed to Modified Mid-S. Sequim Bypass v. Dep't of Transp.,
90 Wash. App. 225, 231 n.2, 951 P.2d 812, 816 n.2 (1998).
9. Id.
10. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
12. In the author's experience, at least half of the projects challenged under SEPA include
an allegation of improperly piecemealed review.
13. See, e.g., Org. to Preserve Agric. Lands v. Adams County, 128 Wash. 2d 869, 880-81,
913 P.2d 793, 800-01 (1996) (Deciding that landfill siting environmental issues, such as
groundwater study, could be deferred to a later operating permit application even though the
application for an operating permit would not concern the suitability of the site for a landfill.
The court was content to refer to a preliminary groundwater analysis which inquired only into
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scape of Washington is being altered by patchwork development
without an understanding of the inevitable impacts.
Part I of this Article introduces the piecemeal problem by de-
scribing three common piecemeal situations. The first situation oc-
curs when a project proposal is divided into such small parts that the
environmental impacts from each individual part appear insignificant
and the impact from the sum of the parts is ignored. The second
situation arises when a project proposal is properly divided into phases
of construction, but earlier phases avoid the speculative study of envi-
ronmental impacts accumulating with later phases, and later phases
are drawn narrowly to avoid study of the cumulative impacts from
earlier phases. The final piecemeal situation arises when environ-
mental review of land use legislation is deferred based on promises of
site-specific review for projects subject to the proposed scheme, but
project proponents subsequently disclaim responsibility for assessing
the cumulative environmental impacts from that legislation. Part II
will then demonstrate the legislative and regulatory intent that envi-
ronmental impacts be examined in a thorough and comprehensive
manner and confirm this requirement of comprehensive review with a
brief examination of case law that establishes a prohibition against
piecemealed review.
After Parts I and II establish that the piecemeal problem should
not exist, Part III will proceed to discuss the source of the continuing
piecemeal problem, specifically addressing the continuing confusion in
the application of two independent regulatory standards purporting to
restrict piecemealed review--cumulative impact analysis and project
connectivity. Part IV examines in detail the judicial confusion over
the interpretation of these standards under both SEPA and its federal
counterpart, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).14 Hav-
ing established that the interpretive confusion is unwarranted, Part V
then considers whether practical concerns may justify the piecemeal
loophole and concludes that such concerns are inimical to the purposes
underlying SEPA. Finally, Part VI of this essay examines supplemen-
tary environmental studies as a potential, but questionable, solution to
the piecemealing problem.
I. AN INTRODUCTION To PIECEMEALING-THREE EXAMPLES
When SEPA is stripped down to its effective elements, shed of
the sparkle and glitter of its "green aspirations," all that remains is the
the "general physical conditions at the site" and noted that the applicant would be required to
study remediation methods at a later date.).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1994).
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mandate that information accompany action."5 SEPA was designed to
combat the ignorance that results from uninformed decision making. 6
Pursuant to the SEPA mandates, agencies are required to prepare a
thorough, two-tiered environmental review, including information
gathering and environmental analysis on collective and cumulative
impacts. 7 The threshold determination is whether the proposal satis-
fies the triggering test: is it a major action significantly affecting the
environment? 8 Then, if there is a likelihood of "more than a moder-
ate" unmitigated adverse effect on the environment, the lead agency
must order an environmental impact statement.'
9
Agencies fall short of SEPA's goals when information is omitted
from, or ignored in, the study of environmental impacts; one of the
reasons SEPA was enacted was to ensure the "consideration of envi-
ronmental factors at the earliest possible stage to allow decisions to be
based on complete disclosure of environmental consequences."2  Al-
though SEPA does not require any particular result in environmental
decision making, it does mandate that "environmental amenities and
values be given appropriate consideration in decision making along
with economic and technical considerations. '"21 However, piecemeal-
ing neutralizes the ability of agencies and the public to access this in-
formation.
Piecemealing may be generalized into three different scenarios.
The first scenario, referred to as the classic piecemealing example,
typically occurs as the segmentation of large, significant projects into
smaller, insignificant parts. Classic piecemealing effects prospective
ignorance due to the difficulties in predicting the cumulative impacts,
number of project parts, or even the ultimate size of the project. In
the other two types of piecemealing-the plan-to-project gap and
regulatory postponement--environmental review of land use planning
15. See Merkel v. Port of Brownsville, 8 Wash. App. 844, 847, 509 P.2d 390, 393 (1973)
("To achieve these goals .... [SEPA] requires all state and local agencies, in performing their
respective functions, to be cognizant of and responsive to possible consequences in their ac-
tions."); see also Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 333 (1989)
("[NEPA] simply prescribes the necessary process for preventing uninformed-rather than un-
wise-agency action.").
16. See Merkel, 8 Wash. App. at 848, 509 P.2d at 393.
17. See Tucker v. Columbia River Gorge Comm'n, 73 Wash. App. 74, 82, 867 P.2d 686,
690 (1994).
18. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(c) (2000).
19. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-794 (2001); Norway Hill Pres. & Prot. Ass'n v.
King County Council, 87 Wash. 2d 267, 278, 522 P.2d 674, 680 (1976).
20. Alpine Lakes Prot. Soc'y v. Wash. State Dep't of Natural Res., 102 Wash. App. 1, 15-
16, 979 P.2d 929, 936 (1999) (emphasis added).
21. Stempel v. Dep't of Water Res., 82 Wash. 2d 109, 118, 508 P.2d 166, 172 (1973);
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(b) (2000).
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avoids premature cumulative impact studies because the nature of the
projects that may be implemented under the plan is speculative. Sub-
sequently, the individual projects implementing the land use plan
seem too minor to be shouldered with the burden of a significant envi-
ronmental impact study.
All three scenarios thus have a common result: the full environ-
mental impacts of a project are never fully investigated or understood.
A. Classic piecemealing-Project Segmentation
Highway construction is the most common example of classic
piecemealed review because new highways are often planned and im-
plemented in small, cost-feasible segments. As each segment is proc-
essed for environmental and regulatory compliance, the lead agency
typically limits environmental impact analysis to the physical footprint
of the proposed segment. The project is approved, and construction
commences without an understanding of the adverse impacts from
constructing the entire stretch of roadway. This, the most rampant
example of piecemealed review, is usually easy to identify.
On the local level, classic piecemealing typically occurs in
"phased" developments. In phased developments, project proponents
seek approval of plans to construct a project in a patchwork fashion
over a period of time. Planning for these projects is often piecemealed
as a matter of practicality because financial or planning concerns force
the project proponent to proceed in phases. On occasion, deferral of a
comprehensive environmental impact study appears logical because
later phases of a project may be subject to change. In the absence of a
concrete plan, project proponents cannot be expected to predict envi-
ronmental impacts at the beginning of the planning stages." How-
ever, an appropriate circumstance for phased construction does not di-
rectly translate into an appropriate circumstance for phased
environmental review." From a SEPA perspective, phasing is im-
proper if it results in an avoidance of a cumulative impact study for
the entire project or for the combination of the various phases of the
project.
24
Unfortunately, agencies often have a common sense tendency to
assume that proposals that appear benign are benign.2' Because the
environmental impact from a small enough segment can appear insig-
22. Cheney v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 87 Wash. 2d 338, 344, 552 P.2d 184, 188-89
(1976).
23. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-060 (2001).
24. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-060(5) (2001).
25. See Achen v. City of Battle Ground, Western Washington Growth Management Hear-
ings Board, No. 99-2-0040, Final Decision and Order, at 14 (May 16, 2000).
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nificant, agencies often process these applications as garden variety
proposals for which far-reaching environmental study seems gratui-
tous. Moreover, the assumed impact from a garden variety proposal
that is substituted for the inquiry into the significance of an action is
very difficult to overcome. Accordingly, garden variety projects are
rubber stamped, and despite SEPA, piecemeal development continues
without an understanding of the cumulative effects of successive de-
velopment on the environment.
B. Plan-to-Project Gap-Continuing Violations
Piecemealed review may also occur in relation to the latter phases
of multi-phase developments or when a particular project is so suc-
cessful that the proponent later decides to expand on the original plan.
Either way, environmental review of the project as a whole is deferred
until the completion of a later phase. In these cases, there may be gaps
in the comprehensiveness of adverse impact review, the administrative
record may demonstrate only patchwork environmental review, and
there may be little or no disclosure of cumulative adverse impacts.
The plan-to-project type of SEPA violation is often more diffi-
cult to detect. Based on timing alone, the applications for earlier
phases can justifiably claim that impacts from the entire project are
speculative because information may be unavailable until construction
on the later phases begins. Then, later development projects within
the confines of the original project maintain the appearance of inde-
pendence because boundaries for the applications are drawn narrowly
to exclude the impacts from earlier phases of construction. As the
later phases of development are implemented, the already constructed
phases create background impact levels against which the later pro-
posals are evaluated. Cursory environmental review in these circum-
stances often follows as a matter of course.
A recent example of this scenario occurred in the the City of
Vancouver, Washington, which currently boasts a 161-acre planned
unit development (PUD) on the outskirts of the city limits. The PUD
designation was approved in 1988, at which time the applicant speci-
fied certain planned uses, but set aside several lots for later develop-
ment.2 6 Primary opposition to the PUD came from members of the
general public, who were concerned with imminent changes to a rural
environment adjacent to the Columbia River." When the proposal
was approved, the entire PUD was shouldered with a Mitigated De-
26. Fisher's Landing Towncenter, PUD 88-03-112/613, Clark County Hearing Exam-
iner's Final Order (June 20, 1988).
27. Id. at 11.
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termination of Non-Significance (MDNS) that promised more com-
prehensive environmental study as development progressed.28
In the final development phases of the PUD, one of the commer-
cial tenants applied for approval of an on-site gasoline facility. 29 The
project was opposed by concerned neighbors, who requested that the
agency honor earlier promises of a comprehensive environmental re-
view. These same neighbors had witnessed the evolution of their once
rural area into a busy, congested area on the outskirts of the City of
Vancouver." Significantly, every project constructed within the
planned boundaries was individually issued a negative threshold de-
termination under SEPA.3"
The neighbors argued that the environmental impacts from the
gasoline facility should be studied as part of the larger development
project. 32 First, the neighbors pointed out that the proposed gasoline
facility would substantially change the original planning approval
since the facility was neither included in, nor studied for, the original
application.33 Second, the neighbors requested study of cumulative
impacts from the piece-by-piece development within the planning
boundaries because the existing record did not demonstrate the slight-
est consideration of cumulative impacts. 34 Finally, the neighbors
asked for fulfillment of promises for a comprehensive study of those
environmental impacts deferred to obtain the original approval.
31
It was clear to the administrative hearings officer, petitioner, and
applicant alike that the gasoline facility proposal constituted another
phase of the larger project.36 The site had been paved during the con-
struction of earlier phases of the project. Traffic volumes to and from
the commercial establishments in the development had risen and were
expected to grow with the added convenience of an on-site gas station.
The feasibility of the gasoline facility was based on the project's incor-
poration into the existing commercial activity at the site. Although
the gas station was held to be part of a larger project, the hearings offi-
28. Id. at 14.
29. Fred Meyer's Gasoline Facility, AU 994372/PSR 200-00023/CUP 2000-00006, City
of Vancouver Hearing Examiner's Final Order (August 3, 2000).
30. Fisher's Landing Towncenter, PUD 88-03-112/613, at 14.
31. Telephone interview with Barbara Ritchie, SEPA Unit, Dep't of Ecology, in Vancou-
ver, WA (Nov. 14, 2001). See also EIS Database Report including Environmental Impact
Statements Received by the Dep't of Ecology from Clark County and the City of Vancouver
from January 1, 1988 to the Present, via FAX from Barbara Ritchie, SEPA Unit, Dep't of Ecol-
ogy (Nov. 14, 2001) (on file with Seattle University Law Review).




36. Id. at 3-4.
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cer was reluctant to find that this circumstance mandated a compre-
hensive environmental review of the entire project.37
The reasons for the hearing officer's reluctance are unclear. Per-
haps he did not think to look past the physical project boundaries.
Perhaps he compared gas station impacts to the background levels of
existing impacts. The impacts of a gas station in a town center are
likely to appear less significant than the impacts of the same gas sta-
tion located on a rural, grassy knoll. Of course, such changes are the
very reason for comprehensive, cumulative impact studies. However,
the gas station in this case was approved without a comprehensive im-
pact study.38
C. Regulatory Postponement-Avoiding Review by Hiding the Ball
A third piecemealing situation occurs when the lead agency for a
legislative or regulatory proposal defers environmental review until the
impacts are better understood, typically in the context of project pro-
posals that are regulated by such action. 39 This is a close relative of
the plan-to-project gap, but is less frequently identified. Tiering in
this situation is appropriate so long as a site-specific environmental
study is eventually accomplished."g
An example of this type of piecemealing is found in environ-
mental studies for local traffic concurrency regulations mandated un-
der the Growth Management Act (GMA).41 For instance, the Van-
couver City Council worked through several concurrency regulatory
efforts over several years. For a time, the city relied on an interim
regulatory system to manage transportation capital facilities that was
enforced pending adoption of permanent standards.4 2 However, when
the City of Vancouver issued a negative threshold determination for
permanent concurrency standards, it intentionally refused to study the
37. Id. at 20 (finding that such a study would be speculative).
38. This approval was affirmed in Boehm v. City of Vancouver, No. 00-2-04060 (Clark
County Super. Ct. 2000), and is currently pending before Division II of the Washington State
Court of Appeals.
39. See, e.g., Cathcart-Maltby-Clearview Cmty. Council v. Snohomish County, 96 Wash.
2d 201, 634 P.2d 853 (1981).
40. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-600(2) (2001).
41. WASH. REV. CODE§ 36.70A.070 (2000).
42. Vancouver, Wash., Ordinance 3284 (Dec. 23, 1996),formerly codified at VANCOUVER,
WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 11.95.; Vancouver, Wash., Ordinance 3354, codified at
VANCOUVER, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 11.95 (1998).
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majority of the environmental impacts expected to result from the
changes to the new permanent standards.
43
Of approximately eighty questions in an environmental checklist
used to make the threshold determination, the City concluded that
sixty-five did not apply ("non-project; does not apply"), with the re-
mainder scattered among various selections of "will be reviewed" and
other non-environmental discussion. 41 Such a determination of non-
significance suggests that environmental study would be "tiered," or
postponed, but not avoided. Otherwise, the threshold determination
would fail to demonstrate that the lead agency had fully considered
environmental impacts. However, tiered review in this case may have
been proper if the city lacked sufficient information to make a deter-
mination on the probability of significant environmental impacts from
the adoption of the new concurrency standards.4"
Unfortunately, the City failed to conduct the intended tiered re-
view of the traffic impacts of subsequent projects.46 One would expect
traffic patterns and volume to change over ten years, five years, and
even over a period of twelve months. Yet, the effects of changing traf-
fic patterns are not considered in administrative records of projects
regulated by the new concurrency standards. Increased roadway run-
off from impervious surfaces carry significant loads of sediment, rub-
ber, oil, and antifreeze into surface waters, increasing the likelihood of
turbidity and degradation of local water quality. Alteration of traffic
patterns by means of geography, speed, volume, and type clearly af-
fects the local quality of life. The danger of these imminent impacts is
probable, significant, and adverse and is directly caused by the traffic
in the area benefitting from the new concurrency standards. In this
context, the city's successive negative threshold determinations and
reluctance to require comprehensive environmental study simply fail
to effectuate the informational purposes of SEPA.
In each of these instances of piecemealed review, the common
element is the effect on our understanding of environmental impacts:
43. Revised Notice of Mitigated Determination of Nonsignificance, issued by City of Van-
couver on December 1, 1999, at 12; Environmental Checklist for Revised Notice of Mitigated
Determination of Nonsignificance, issued by City of Vancouver on December 1, 1999.
44. Id.
45. In such cases, the previous SEPA document is incorporated by reference and becomes
part of the new document and administrative record. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-635
(2001); Klickitat County Citizens Against Imported Waste v. Klickitat County, 122 Wash. 2d
619, 635, 860 P.2d 390, 399 (1993).
46. See, eg., Grand Firs Subdivision, AU991131, City of Vancouver Hearing Examiner's
Final Order (2000) (finding, in an unrelated SEPA appeal, that adoption of concurrency stan-
dards must have encompassed such impacts, and that any attack on the environmental review of
those standards would be impermissibly collateral).
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construction commences and the landscape is irreversibly altered
without a thorough understanding of how those projects will adversely
affect the environment. The problem does not lie in the significance
of each individual part of a project, but in the sum of the project's con-
stituent parts. For this reason, challenges to piecemealed review under
SEPA are typically leveled at an absence of, or inadequacy in, cumula-
tive impact studies for the proposals at hand.
II. CLOSING THE PIECEMEAL LOOPHOLE
When piecemealed environmental review occurs, agencies lack
information regarding the adverse impacts a project proposal will
cause in conjunction with other actions. However, SEPA and its fed-
eral counterpart are well suited to battle this issue. The drafters of
SEPA appear to have anticipated piecemealed review and designed the
statute with the tools to prevent information gaps and ensure informed
decision making. Likewise, some courts have recognized the risks of
piecemealing and have applied these statutory tools to prohibit agen-
cies from conducting only piecemealed review.
A. Regulatory Prohibition of Piecemealed Environmental Review
SEPA is an "action-forcing"47 statute designed to curtail the ill
effects of overzealous and careless governmental actions by requiring
comprehensive and thorough environmental review. SEPA requires
agencies to "include in every recommendation or report on proposals
for legislation and other major actions significantly affecting the qual-
ity of the environment, a detailed statement ... on the environmental
impact of the proposed action. '"48 The intended effect of this mandate
is to compel agencies "to be cognizant of and responsive to possible
environmental consequences in their actions.""
Thus, SEPA, like NEPA, serves a dual role. First, "[i]t ensures
that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and will
carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant envi-
47. "The term 'action-forcing' was introduced during the Senate's consideration of NEPA,
and refers to the notion that preparation of an EIS ensures that the environmental goals set out in
NEPA are 'infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government."' 115
CONG. REc. 40416 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Jackson) (cited in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S.
390, 409 n.18 (1976)).
48. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030 (2000); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1994) (NEPA
counterpart).
49. See also Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 859 F.2d 1134, 1141 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating
that the purpose of the mandate is to "compel the decision-maker to give serious weight to envi-
ronmental factors ... and to enable the public to understand and consider meaningfully the fac-
tors involved.") (citations omitted).
[Vol. 25:343
2001] Challenging Piecemealed Review
ronmental impacts.""0 Second, SEPA, like NEPA, "guarantees that
the relevant information will be made available to the larger audience
that may also play a role in both the decisionmaking process and the
implementation of that decision."'" SEPA aims to correct a history of
unreasoned agency action and ensure that future actions will be based
on information, rather than in spite of it.12 In sum, piecemealed re-
view should not exist where SEPA is properly enforced.
SEPA provides four useful tools for agencies attempting to close
information gaps and advance SEPA's general policy goals. First,
SEPA requires an agency to define the boundaries of the proposal at
hand.53 Of course, SEPA does not require a "crystal ball" inquiry into
the possible impacts, where identifying those potentially adverse im-
pacts becomes an exercise in speculation."4 SEPA focuses on proposed
rather than contemplated actions, and defines "actions" to include
only those future proposals that have a degree of relative certainty. 55
However, environmental review must be at least as broad as the pro-
posal, and in most cases, the environmental study will exceed the
boundaries of the proposed project.56
Second, although SEPA does not require redundant and repeti-
tive study,5 7 it does require that where actions are "related to each
50. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989).
51. Id. See generally Kenneth Murchinson, Does NEPA Matter? An Analysis of the His-
torical Development and Contemporary Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 18 U.
RICH. L. REV. 557, 612 (1984) (arguing that environmental organizations would be far less effec-
tive without information gathered through the NEPA procedures).
52. See also Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989) (stating that the
purpose of NEPA is to ensure an agency "will not act on incomplete information, only to regret
its decision after it is too late to correct.").
53. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-11-060, -704(1)-(2), -792 (2001).
54. See Cheney v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 87 Wash. 2d 338, 344, 552 P.2d 184, 188
(1976) ("it is impractical if not impossible to identify and evaluate every remote and speculative
consequence of an action."); see also County of Suffolk v. Sec'y of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1378
(2d Cir. 1977).
55. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-704 (2001); Cheney, 87 Wash. 2d at 344-45, 552
P.2d at 188 (holding that a possible future, yet unproposed development project is not an action
or proposal such that an environmental document must be prepared for its impacts); see also
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.20 (1976).
56. See Cheney, 87 Wash. 2d at 344, 552 P.2d at 188 ("implicit in the statute is the re-
quirement that the decision makers consider more than what might be the narrow, limited
environmental impact of the immediate, pending action").
57. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-060 (2001). Because separate environmental de-
terminations could cover the same impacts and projects, the 1995 regulatory reform legislation
prohibits the revival of past determinations without discovery of new information or some press-
ing reason to reopen discussion. Engrossed Substitute House Bill (ESHB) 1724, 1995 Wash.
Laws ch. 347. In particular, regulatory reform was intended to relieve local government from the
duplicative study of environmental impacts, first at the proposal of comprehensive plan amend-
ments and then again for projects subject to the comprehensive plan. WASH. REV. CODE §
43.21C.240 (2000).
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other closely enough to be, in effect, a single course of action," the en-
vironmental review is performed in a single document.5 8 Actions are
considered sufficiently related if they will not proceed unless the other
actions are "implemented simultaneously with them," or are "interde-
pendent parts of a larger proposal and depend on the larger proposal
as their justification or for their implementation."
5 9
Third, SEPA regulations suggest that projects should be joined
for the purpose of analyzing their adverse impacts when they are ei-
ther: (1) linked geographically; (2) related by some relevant similarity,
such as timing, impacts, alternatives, methods of implementation,
media, or subject matter; or (3) sharing a stage of technological devel-
opment.6" SEPA thus suggests an optional ground for closing piece-
mealed review, creating a strong presumption that separate projects
should be studied together when impacts are "similar," related in
kind, type, or location. 61
Finally, SEPA requires cumulative impact consideration among
separate projects, as well as where several projects impact the same lo-
cal environment. 2 Although SEPA contains neither a statutory nor
regulatory definition of "cumulative impacts" or "cumulative effects,"
Washington courts may be guided by NEPA's expansive definition,63
which includes environmental impacts resulting from "the incremental
58. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-060(3)(b) (2001); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25
(2000).
59. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-11-060(3)(b)(i)-(ii), -060(5)(d) (2001); see also 40
C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1) (2000). The rule prohibits phased review of a substantial projector con-
nected projects if:
(i) The sequence is from a narrow project document to a broad policy document;
(ii) [Phased review] would merely divide a larger system into exempted fragments or
avoid discussion of cumulative impacts; or
(iii) [Phased review] would segment and avoid present consideration of proposals and
their impacts that are required to be evaluated in a single environmental document
under WAC 197-11-060(3)(b) or 197-11-305(1) (2001); however, the level of detail
and type of environmental review may vary with the nature and timing of proposals
and their component parts.
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-060(5)(d).
60. This provision does not contain an outer boundary for cumulative impact study. The
extent of connected impacts could conceivably extend throughout the world for eternity. How-
ever, no court has been bold enough to give such an expansive interpretation.
61. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-060(3)(c)(i) (2001) ("Proposals are similar if, when
viewed with other reasonably foreseeable actions, they have common aspects that provide a basis
for evaluating their environmental consequences together, such as common timing, types of im-
pacts, alternatives, or geography."); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4 (2000) (NEPA counterpart).
62. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-11-060(4)(e), -228(2)(c), -235(5)(b), -792(2)(c)(iii)
(2001).
63. See, e.g., Eastlake Cmty. Council v. Roanoke Ass'n., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 475, 488 n.5,
513 P.2d 36, 45 n.5 (1973).
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impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably
foreseeable future actions.
64
In certain situations, SEPA regulations do seek efficiency by al-
lowing agencies to "phase" and "tier" environmental review.65 Phased
review allows the lead agency to study adverse environmental impacts
effectively where separate determinations cover the same impacts and
projects. Agencies have flexibility in phasing decisions in the non-
project planning stages.66 Of course, these provisions do not permit
escape from the informational requirements of SEPA. In theory, the
later environmental document for the project implementation must in-
clude an analysis of the impacts not already covered in the program-
matic environmental study.67 Accordingly, not every proposal is ripe
for phased review.
SEPA drafters anticipated the possibility of complacency in envi-
ronmental studies and equipped SEPA with tools to deal with such
situations. SEPA's regulatory language suggests that piecemealed and
segmented environmental review is properly cured by the agency's
first withdrawing of the respondent's threshold determination,68 and
then ordering project proponents to perform supplemental environ-
mental review.69 Other SEPA regulations require supplemental review
(in the form of either a new threshold determination or a supplemental
environmental impact statement) where there has been (1) a substan-
tial change to a proposal, increasing the likelihood of significant ad-
verse environmental impacts; (2) a discovery of new information that
suggests the likelihood of significant adverse environmental impacts;
or (3) a threshold determination that was based on material non-
disclosure of information.7"
The legislative drafters thus ensured that agencies could over-
come the problem of piecemeal review. However, where the agencies
have failed to properly utilize their powers under SEPA, it is left to the
courts to ensure that the practice of piecemeal review is not allowed to
continue.
64. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2000); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7) (2000) ("Significance ex-
ists if it reasonable to anticipate a cumulatively significant impact on the environment.").
65. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-060(5) (2001); San Juan County v. Dep't of Natu-
ral Res., 28 Wash. App. 796, 802, 626 P.2d 995, 998 (1981) (finding that the potential for a pro-
ject's future expansion was not firm enough to justify environmental review of that contingent
future action).
66. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE§§ 197-11-442, -600(2) (2001).
67. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-443(2) (2001).
68. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-340(3)(a) (2001).
69. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-060 (2001); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1509(c)(1)(ii)
(2000) (NEPA counterpart).
70. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-600(3) (2001).
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B. Judicial Attack on Piecemealed Projects
An active Washington court wasted no time implementing the
full mandate of SEPA against piecemealed review. In Merkel v. Port
of Brownsville,71 the plaintiffs challenged a proposal for upland clearing
and grading on property adjacent to a small marina redevelopment
project. The defendant Port claimed that upland construction was ac-
tually a separate project because the water-dependent and uplands ar-
eas fell under different regulatory schemes, and were, therefore, inde-
pendent.72 The court disagreed, finding that "[t]here is nothing in the
record ... to indicate that the contemplated construction has ever
been anything but one project."73 The Merkel court ordered the Port
to combine the projects for purposes of environmental analysis. The
court then emphasized the incompatibility of piecemeal review with
SEPA's goals as follows:
The frustrating effect of such piecemeal administrative approv-
als upon the vitality of [SEPA] compels us to answer in the
negative.... To permit the piecemeal development urged upon
us ... would lower the environmental mandates of these acts to
the status of mere admonitions. The result would be frustration
rather than fulfillment of the legislative intent inherent in these
acts.
Federal courts applying NEPA have also addressed the question
of piecemealed environmental study, referred to as improper project
segmentation. Like the Merkel court, federal courts have been aware
that segmentation "allows an agency to avoid the NEPA requirement
that an EIS be prepared for all major federal actions with significant
impacts by dividing the overall plan into component parts, each in-
volving action with less significant environmental effects."7" Federal
courts appear to have firmly rejected agency attempts to bypass
NEPA's protections, often finding agencies engaged in unlawful seg-
mentation of projects in order to avoid consideration of an action's ef-
fects on the environment.76
71. 8 Wash. App. 844, 509 P.2d 390 (1973).
72. Id. at 850, 509 P.2d at 395.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 851, 509 P.2d at 395.
75. Taxpayer's Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
76. See, e.g., City of Rochester v. United States Postal Serv., 541 F.2d 967, 972 (2d Cir.
1976) (holding that avoiding comprehensive study of environmental impact by dividing project
into smaller, insignificant proposals would create "a clear loophole in NEPA"); Alpine Lakes
Prot. Soc'y v. Schlapfer, 518 F.2d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that when reviewing
piecemealed impact studies courts should look to "prevent the policies of NEPA from being nib-
bled away by multiple increments"); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1985)
[Vol. 25:343
Challenging Piecemealed Review
For instance, in Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'n v. United States
Postal Service,77 the Second Circuit reviewed a citizen challenge to a
proposed postal vehicle maintenance facility. The plaintiffs chal-
lenged the proposal under NEPA because the postal service had not
studied the significant adverse impacts from development of the entire
property. Among other things, the proposal included on-site housing
units that were mentioned, but effectively excluded from the environ-
mental determination. The Second Circuit insightfully determined
that the informational purposes of NEPA would be subverted if the
project could be divided and studied as independent, insignificant ac-
tions.
78
Likewise, in Thomas v. Peterson, the Ninth Circuit addressed the
issue of whether NEPA required the Forest Service to consider, in a
single review process, the environmental impacts of a forest road in-
tended to facilitate logging and any resulting timber sales.79 The Tho-
mas court was satisfied by plaintiffs demonstration of interconnected-
ness and held that the logging operations and the construction of the
road were "connected actions" because "the timber sales [could not]
proceed without the road, and the road would not be built but for the
contemplated timber sales."8
The introductory section of this essay described three different
types of piecemealing, one of which results in prospective ignorance,
the other two ignoring the cumulative impacts of past actions. In the
seemingly comprehensive SEPA framework, the mere existence of
piecemealed review defies logic. The regulatory framework of SEPA
appears to anticipate piecemealed review and, when properly identi-
(holding that the construction of a road to facilitate logging and the sale of the timber that would
result from that logging were "connected actions" and, therefore, had to be addressed in a single
EIS); Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467, 477-78 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that an EIS had to
consider the impacts of supplying federal power and constructing a private magnesium plant that
used the power because the two actions were connected).
77. Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 516 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.
1975).
78. Id. at 388.
79. Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1985).
80. Id. The court continued:
IT]he Fish & Wildlife Service has written, "Separate documentation of related and
cumulative potential impacts may be leading to aquatic habitat degradation unac-
counted for in individual EA's (i.e., undocumented cumulative effects) .... Lack of
an overall effort to document cumulative impacts could be having present and future
detrimental effects on wolf recovery potential." These comments are sufficient to
raise "substantial questions" as to whether the road and the timber sales will have sig-
nificant cumulative environmental effects. Therefore, on this basis also, the Forest
Service is required to prepare an EIS analyzing such effects.
Id. (citations omitted); see also People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp 811 (D. Haw. 1973).
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fled, piecemealing is flatly rejected.81 Nonetheless, the practice is an
ongoing problem before agencies and courts, suggesting a loophole or
some other deficiency in the SEPA regulatory scheme.
III. SOURCES OF THE CONTINUING PIECEMEAL PROBLEM
It is likely that there are several contributing sources to the ongo-
ing piecemeal problem. At the onset, we can look to consistency in the
regulations themselves to identify confusion. This section encounters
two such problems, both of which are subject to an interpretation that
undermines the need for cumulative impact study: the first concerns
the SEPA requirement that "interdependent" projects be studied to-
gether; and the second is the potential of abuse in the phasing process.
A. Impact versus Connectedness Analysis-Mutually Exclusive?
Under SEPA, evaluation in a single document is mandatory
when projects are "related to each other closely enough to be, in effect,
a single course of action. '"82 The "project connectedness" or "interde-
pendency" inquiry is grounded in the assumption that the project it-
self is central to the analysis. In addition, comprehensive SEPA re-
83view is triggered by an interrelation or accumulation of impacts.
Interestingly, although the two standards aim at the enforcement of
SEPA against piecemealed review, courts have applied the standards
in a confusing, inconsistent manner.84
Cumulative impact analysis is extremely broad. 5  The courts
have repeatedly stated that requiring a study of cumulative impacts
means gaining an understanding of impacts that accumulate, through
time and across project boundaries, by studying the combined effects
of those impacts.8 6 Moreover, the cumulative impacts mandate is as
grounded in common sense as it is in law.87 The Washington Su-
81. See, e.g., Merkel v. Port of Brownsville, 8 Wash. App. 844, 851, 509 P.2d 390, 394
(1973); see also Sierra Club v. Penfold, 664 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (D. Alaska 1987) ("[If ever
there was a paradigm instance of 'cumulative' or 'synergistic' impacts, it is this case. Dozens of
small operations of a single type incrementally contribute to deterioration of water quality in a
common drainage stream."), affd, 857 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988).
82. WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 197-11-060(3)(b) (2001).
83. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-11-060(5)(d), -060(3)(c) (2001).
84. For a deeper discussion of the possible confusion among these standards under NEPA,
see Terence L. Thatcher, Understanding Interdependence in the Natural Environment: Some
Thoughts on Cumulative Impact Assessment Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 20
ENVTL. L. 611 (1990).
85. See Penfold, 664 F. Supp. at 1303.
86. See Hayes v. Yount, 87 Wash. 2d 280, 287, 552 P.2d 1038, 1043 (1976).




preme Court has illustrated the logic behind the cumulative impacts
study requirement as follows: "Logic and common sense suggest that
numerous projects, each having no significant effect individually, may
well have very significant effects when taken together. This concept
of cumulative environmental harm has received legislative and judicial
recognition.""8 Implicit in the court's "logic and common sense" is
that alteration of the natural landscape can have a continuing adverse
impact; therefore, the fact that a project was previously reviewed does
not mean that it will no longer have an impact, especially when added
to subsequent actions altering or impacting the environment. 89 Not
surprisingly, an awareness of the cumulative impacts caused by a pro-
posal is an essential element of the threshold environmental determi-
nation, 90 and courts interpreting the mandate of SEPA have deter-
mined that the failure to engage in cumulative impact analysis is a
proper ground for denial of a development application.91
In contrast to cumulative impact analysis, a determination of
project connectivity is limited to a demonstration of property and pro-
posal ownership, functionality of the proposals themselves, and possi-
bly shared facilities, geography and funding.92 Project-based analysis
is very much limited to the face of the application and that informa-
tion disclosed by the applicant. In theory, because "interdependent"
projects are likely to have cumulative impacts, but projects need not
be physically or functionally connected to accumulate impacts, the
sheer expansiveness of cumulative impacts analysis will subsume
analysis based on project connectivity or interdependence.
Despite the differences between project connectivity and cumula-
tive impact analyses, the two are not in conflict. Whether viewed
from a project-based or impact-based context, the weight of SEPA law
prohibits the piecemealing of projects into a size at which impacts ap-
pear insignificant in order to avoid the study of environmental im-
pacts. 93 Both standards effectuate the informational goals of SEPA by
enlarging the study of adverse environmental impacts from a given
proposal. At the very least, a finding that two projects fail to share the
88. See Hayes, 87 Wash. 2d at 287-88, 552 P.2d at 1038.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Alpine Lakes Prot. Soc'y v. Wash. State Dep't of Natural Res., 102 Wash.
App. 1, 14-15, 979 P.2d 929, 936-38 (1999).
91. See Tucker v. Columbia River Gorge Comm'n, 73 Wash. App. 74, 82, 867 P.2d 686,
690 (1994). Likewise, under NEPA, "[i]f several actions have a cumulative environmental effect,
this consequence must be considered in an EIS." Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Black-
wood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir. 1998).
92. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-11-060(3), -060(5) (2001).
93. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-060(5)(d); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1)
(2000) (NEPA counterpart).
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requisite interdependence should not effect an exemption from con-
sideration of the combined impacts caused from completion of both
proposals. Again, although two projects may be functionally and
physically distinct, the combined effect of completing both projects
may still have a cumulative impact.
Why, then, do courts fail to implement the cumulative impact
standard? Reconciliation of regulatory and statutory language is not
an unfamiliar task to courts. Oddly, although cumulative impacts is-
sues may be the most familiar basis for public challenges to SEPA
proceedings, seldom does the judiciary discuss the relations between
cumulative impacts and project connectedness analysis. In fact, in-
stead of reconciling the possible interpretations of the separate regula-
tions, courts appear to independently interpret them and choose either
cumulative impact or connectivity analysis, but not both.94 In many
cases, the court's choice between the analyses typically determines
whether the challenged environmental study is found inadequate or
not. Interestingly, in virtually every case refusing to remand for im-
proper piecemealing, the Washington State Supreme Court chose to
review only the connectedness of the challenged projects.
Worse yet, even though an agency may not ignore the environ-
mental impacts of actions that are connected to other actions, % courts
have cited the "connected action" definition to exempt projects from
cumulative environmental review. For instance, in Morongo Band of
Mission Indians v. FAA, 96 the federal court interpreting NEPA specifi-
cally affirmed segregation of environmental studies, ignoring the in-
teraction between an airport's arrival enhancement project (AEP) from
review of a larger airport expansion project. The FAA was preparing
an EIS for the latter, but neglected contemporaneous review of the
former, finding that each project had independent utility.97 The court
expressly recognized interconnection of the impacts and that the ex-
pansion project would exacerbate the problems being addressed by the
AEP, but found that the AEP proposal was designed to deal with ex-
isting problems and, therefore, was not functionally connected to a fu-
ture expansion project.98 The Morongo Band court dismissed the chal-
94. Compare Merkel v. Port of Brownsville, 8 Wash. App. 844, 851, 509 P.2d 390, 394
(1973) (impact accumulation) with Org. to Preserve Agric. Lands v. Adams County, 128 Wash.
2d 869, 880, 913 P.2d 793, 800 (1996) (phasing rule). Compare Tenakee Springs v. Clough, 915
F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1990) (impact analysis) with Wetlands Action Network v. United
States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000) (connectedness).
95. See Village of Grand View v. Skinner, 947 F.2d 651, 657 (2d Cir. 1991); see also 40
C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1) (2001); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-060 (2001).
96. 161 F.3d 569 (9th Cir. 1998).




lenge without considering the propriety of ordering a cumulative im-
pact study.
B. Phased Review-Avoiding Cumulative Impact Studies
Another possible source of confusion, leading to the piecemeal
gap in SEPA, is in relation to the "phasing" rule. Environmental re-
view may be phased.99 Phased review aims at creating greater effi-
ciency in environmental review and "assists agencies and the public to
focus on issues that are ready for decision and exclude from considera-
tion issues already decided or not yet ready.""' SEPA rules provide
three distinct, functionally related criteria delineating properly phased
review: one provision provides authority to phase, and the other two
limit exercise of the practice.
First, agencies may "phase" review when either (1) the sequence
of review is from a broader, non-project environmental document to
later review of a narrow, site-specific scope; or (2) when the present
proceeding is too early to identify environmental impacts, and the
agency will complete subsequent environmental review at a later stage
of development." 1 Second, the rules also specify that phased review is
not appropriate in piecemealing situations, including when phased re-
view "would merely divide a larger system into exempted fragments,"
or more importantly, when phasing would "avoid discussion of cumu-
lative impacts. 10 2 To repeat, phased review may not be interpreted to
avoid the study of cumulative impacts. The rules go even further,
prohibiting deferral of environmental review when such deferral
"would segment and avoid present consideration of proposals and
their impacts that are required to be evaluated in a single environ-
mental document . "..."103 It is arguable that SEPA regulations could
not have been better drafted to provide a more effective prohibition
against piecemealed review.
Nonetheless, the third provision on phasing is most often cited
by courts to exempt agency study of cumulative impacts or to other-
wise evade piecemealing challenges. The third provision states that
"[p]roposals or parts of proposals that are related to each other closely
enough to be, in effect, a single course of action shall be evaluated in
the same environmental document."10 4 Under this rule, the adverse
environmental impacts from separate proposals must be analyzed in
99. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-060(5) (2001).
100. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-060(5)(b) (2001).
101. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-060(5)(c) (2001).
102. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-060(5)(d) (2001).
103. Id.
104. WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 197-11-060(3)(b).
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the same environmental document if they: "(i) Cannot or will not pro-
ceed unless the other proposals (or parts of proposals) are imple-
mented simultaneously with them; or (ii) Are interdependent parts of
a larger proposal and depend on the larger proposal as their justifica-
tion or for their implementation. '
This rule only discusses combining the study of several projects
into a single, comprehensive document. Notably, the provision is not
presented as an exemption, justification or excuse. This provision
demands that the lead agency broaden the scope of an environmental
study under the stated circumstances. Under the above regulatory
analysis, citation to the phasing rule to relieve a proposal of further
study is contrary to both the rules and purposes of SEPA. However,
as described below, case law indicates that the courts do not apply
SEPA as it is written, suggesting the possibility of extra-statutory mo-
tives in environmental review.
IV. THE JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE
If the informational purposes of SEPA presented here are accu-
rate, a piecemeal challenge should be answered with a greater effort at
information gathering. On other issues, Washington courts have im-
plemented this policy in a commendable fashion." 6 Unfortunately,
Washington courts often resolve piecemeal challenges without discus-
sion, or by briefly and generically citing to SEPA regulations. °7 Oc-
casionally, the court is even faced with ill-conceived challenges under
circumstances that hardly suggest impropriety.' Even from the re-
ported cases demonstrating merit, courts have yet to establish an ap-
propriate test for distinguishing proper versus improper segregated re-
view. Under both SEPA and NEPA, this lack of guidance has
clouded judicial understanding of the piecemeal problem.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Gardner v. Pierce County, 27 Wash. App. 241, 245, 617 P.2d 743, 746
(1980) (demanding adequate information to make a threshold determination); Bellevue Farm
Owners v. Shorelines Bd., 100 Wash. App. 341, 352-53, 997 P.2d 380, 386-87 (2000) (rejecting
the argument that one agency's DNS under SEPA could preclude a different agency's impact
analysis under the Shorelines Management Act).
107. See, e.g., Puget Sound Energy v. State Shorelines Hearings Bd., No. 44083-7-I, 2000
WL 987128 (Wash. App. July 17, 2000) (Although dismissed on grounds of standing, the court
cited the phasing rule and dismissed a challenge alleging piecemealing of electricity substation
from erection of power line. The court reasoned that projects were not connected because the
application to erect the power lines had not yet been filed.).
108. See Swift v. Island County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 362, 552 P.2d 175, 184 (1976) (dismiss-
ing piecemeal challenge because cumulative impacts would be covered in a court-ordered pro-
ject-wide EIS); Concerned Taxpayers Opposed to Modified Mid-S. Sequim Bypass v. Dep't. of
Transp., 90 Wash. App. 225, 231, 951 P.2d 812, 817 (1998) (rejecting misconceived piecemeal
challenge against EIS that studied present project proposal and future additions to the project).
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A. SEPA's Project-Based Analysis
It is possible to interpret SEPA case law to hold that the piece-
meal prohibition is a means to close the loophole and effectuate the in-
formational purposes of SEPA. Although there are no cases distin-
guishing piecemealed from properly phased review, the courts have on
occasion considered evidence suggesting that the impacts from sepa-
rate projects may combine or accumulate. Courts have found that
separate projects are sufficiently related for analysis in a single docu-
ment when they are linked by a common purpose such as a destination
or a development project," 9 or where two projects share a geographical
location. " '
Unfortunately, the more convincing reading of Washington case
law indicates that, besides the Merkel decision, Washington courts
seem to focus their attention on connectivity analysis. In Cathcart-
Maltby-Clearview Community Council v. Snohomish County,11 a dissat-
isfied community challenged a rezone approval that would enable the
transformation of 1,800 undeveloped acres into 6,000 residential units.
The EIS for the rezone was conceded to be a "bare bones" study, "de-
void of any quantitative discussion as to cumulative and secondary ef-
fects on the surrounding areas."" 2 Nevertheless, the court found the
EIS adequate as a matter of law because the developments would re-
quire later approvals and, hence, would eventually require environ-
mental review. " 3 The court was persuaded by evidence that the
county had demonstrated a willingness to refuse site specific permit
approvals where environmental problems persist." 4 However, the
court did not address whether a comprehensive cumulative impact
study would be performed as a condition of any particular site specific
approval. The court failed to implement the cumulative impact man-
date.
Unfortunately, the Cathcart-Maltby- Clearview court engaged in
a gratuitous frolic down dictum lane that resulted in poor precedential
decision making. The court misinterpreted SEPA and expressly
promulgated criteria for when "piecemeal review is permissible.""' 5
109. See Merkel v. Port of Brownsville, 8 Wash. App. 844, 850, 509 P.2d 390, 394 (1973).
110. See Indian Trail Property Owner's Ass'n v. City of Spokane, 76 Wash. App. 430,
443, 886 P.2d 209, 218 (1994) (separating SEPA review for car wash from remainder of shopping
center, even though car wash required separate development review, constituted error under
SEPA).
111. 96 Wash. 2d 201, 634 P.2d 853 (1981).
112. Id. at 209-10.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 211.
115. Id. at 210.
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According to the court, piecemeal review is appropriate "if the first
phase of the project is independent of the second[,] and if the conse-
quences of the ultimate development cannot be initially assessed." '116
Clearly, the court misspoke; the proposition, which is stated as a rule,
only encompasses project connectedness analysis under the "phased
review" rule." 7 The court did not add to this list an agency's obliga-
tion to discuss the cumulative impacts from these projects. Unfortu-
nately, the court's semantic difficulty has subsequently been cited as
the rule." 8
Similarly, the court in Organization to Preserve Agricultural Lands
v. Adams County (OPAL)"9 misunderstood the gravity of its piecemeal
challenge. Because OPAL concerned a landfill siting proposal, review
was limited to environmental issues affecting the decision to locate the
landfill at that particular site. However, there were objections to the
proposal due to deferral of a groundwater impact study for the pro-
posed site. The court revisited the piecemeal rule and cited Cathcart-
Maltby-Clearview for the proposition that deferral of environmental
review is appropriate when the proposal is required to seek subsequent
review. The court did not make the same semantic error as in Cath-
cart-Maltby- Clearview and instead cited the regulatory rules for
phased review, relying on the fact that further review would be neces-
sary for an operating permit. 2 The OPAL court's analysis, like the
court's analysis in Cathcart-Maltby- Clearview, was incorrect. In both
cases, environmental review was deferred to a later date and in the
context of individual construction projects, making cumulative impact
review unlikely. Indeed, the court in Cathcart-Maltby-Clearview ad-
mitted that segmenting review of the adverse environmental impacts
116. Id. (citing Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wash. 2d 843, 613 P.2d 1148 (1980), and Che-
ney v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 87 Wash. 2d 338, 552 P.2d 184 (1976)).
117. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-11-060(3)(b), -060(5) (2001).
118. See, e.g., Murden Cove v. Kitsap County, 41 Wash. App. 515, 526, 704 P.2d 1242,
1249 (1985). In Murden Cove, the court reviewed a negative threshold determination issued for a
rezone and planned unit development application. The applicant, whose tract extended beyond
the application boundary, sought a zoning designation that would permit industrial uses on an
undeveloped portion of the property. The environmental checklist submitted for the application,
along with the negative threshold determination, contained incomplete information and analysis
for the proposed land uses on the site. The court upheld the approval, finding that a rezone for a
planned unit development, approved for the purpose of enabling the development of the prop-
erty, was not "dependent upon, functionally related to, or causally connected to" the future de-
velopment. The Murden Cove court specifically cited the "rule" that "piecemeal review is per-
missible." Id. at 526.
119. Org. to Preserve Agric. Lands v. Adams County, 128 Wash. 2d 869, 880, 913 P.2d
793 (1996).
120. Id. at 880-81,634 P.2d at 800-01.
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of the siting decision to a time when the parties have already commit-
ted to the site results in improper piecemealing.12'
In sum, Washington courts have been reluctant to apply the wis-
dom of the Merkel court and have consistently rejected challenges to
piecemealed review when brought early in the development process.
The courts' stance on this issue incorrectly implies that the Washing-
ton piecemeal test is contingent on the interdependency of the propos-
als themselves rather than the interrelation of the environmental im-
pacts. Additionally, although one might think Washington courts
could look to the federal courts for guidance, the federal courts them-
selves have fared no better.
B. The Federal Experience
Federal courts have created similar interpretive difficulties in im-
plementing the NEPA regulatory scheme. Since NEPA's youth, fed-
eral courts have been actively engaged in developing criteria designed
to determine whether project segmentation is improper.122 However,
federal courts have been unable to reconcile the definition of cumula-
tive impacts, which expands the scope of environmental study, with
the court's application of "connectedness," which has been interpreted
to limit the scope of study. In this sense, the Ninth Circuit's interpre-
tation of NEPA is exemplary, not for its adherence to the principals
expressed in NEPA, but for consistently demonstrating the uncer-
tainty and confusion displayed in other jurisdictions. Early on, the
Ninth Circuit's persistence in thwarting segmented review was unpar-
alleled. However, recent case law contradicts the earlier holdings.
Over a decade ago, the Ninth Circuit correctly interpreted the
NEPA statute and invalidated a permit issued by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) for violations of NEPA. In
LaFlamme v. FERC,123 FERC had based its assertion of NEPA com-
pliance on a comprehensive EIS that had been prepared for a separate
project. However, the adopted EIS failed to analyze the cumulative
impacts from a handful of unrelated projects that would impact the
same general location as FERC's proposed project. The court cited
121. Cathcart-Maltby-Clearview Cmty. Council v. Snohomish County, 96 Wash. 2d 201,
210-11, 634 P.2d 853, 859 (1981).
122. Federal courts often demonstrate a willingness to strictly apply the regulatory terms to
effectuate more the policy of NEPA. For example, one federal court has stated that "the con-
cepts of 'independent utility' or 'logical termini' are not talismans that truncate the natural scope
of an EIS. Reason mandates that the defendants assess the environmental harm" that arises from
the proposed project. Appalachian Mountain Club v. Brinegar, 394 F. Supp. 105, 117 (D. N.H.
1975).
123. 852 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1988).
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NEPA's definition for "cumulative impacts" and refused FERC's as-
sertion of NEPA compliance, finding that FERC had violated NEPA
when "they examined the ... project in isolation, without considering
the 'net' impact that all projects in the area may have on the environ-
ment. "124 The LaFlamme court was not bound by project connec-
tivity; the court concentrated on geographical relation, hence impact
connectivity was the proper target of the cumulative impact study.
Two years later, the Ninth Circuit Court applied the LaFlamme
holding to invalidate a ten-volume Supplemental Environmental Im-
pact Statement (SEIS) prepared for old growth timber harvesting in
Alaska. 2 ' Again citing to cumulative impacts analysis, the court was
concerned by the lack of cumulative impact study for a number of
other geographically-related projects.'26 The court cited LaFlamme for
the prohibition against examining "single projects in isolation without
considering the net impact that all the projects in the area might have
on the environment."'
' 27
A string of cases between 1998 and 1999 confirmed the Ninth
Circuit's impact based, geographical approach to environmental im-
pact study. In Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. United States Forest
Service, 2 ' the Ninth Circuit invalidated an EIS for the failure to evalu-
ate adequately the cumulative effects of three nearby timber sales.'29
In Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 3 ' the court or-
dered a single, comprehensive EIS to evaluate the cumulative impacts
of five independent timber sales where all five sales contributed to a
fire recovery strategy in the Umatilla National Forest.
Finally, in Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. United States Forest Ser-
vice,' 3' the court examined the review of several resource management
plans and land exchanges geared toward enabling timber sales in Mt.
Baker-Snoqualmie National Forest. In response to the challenge, the
Forest Service had produced a plethora of watershed analyses and en-
vironmental impact statements prepared at various times over a fifteen
year period.'32 Nonetheless, the Muckleshoot court sent a message of
strict NEPA compliance, rejecting the Forest Service's EIS because
the analysis of impacts accumulating from other projects in the area
124. Id. at 402.
125. City of Tenakee Springs v. Clough, 915 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1990).
126. Id. at 1313.
127. Id. at 1312.
128. 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir.1998).
129. Id. at 1378-81.
130. 161 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1998).




was "far too general and one-sided to meet the NEPA requirements,"
and failed to provide "a useful analysis" as required under NEPA.'33
This series of Ninth Circuit cases may represent the most suc-
cessful reported effort combating piecemealed review. In each in-
stance, the court was influenced by the combined, singular effect made
by separate projects, at separate times, involving separate actors. The
court was less concerned with the interdependency or connectedness
of the projects themselves and did not allow the facade of project con-
nectedness to block a searching inquiry into the synergistic impacts af-
fecting a local environment.
All good things, it is said, must come to an end. So it was with
the Ninth Circuit's battle against piecemealed environmental study.
In Wetlands Action Network v. United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers,134 the Ninth Circuit refocused its attention to a strict "independ-
ent utility" test. The Wetlands Action court noted the lack of clarity in
multi-party piecemealing cases because NEPA "does not specify the
scope of analysis that federal agencies must conduct in determining
whether their actions, when combined with private actions, come
within the mandate of [NEPA]."'13  Citing to the regulations, the
court inquired into the connectivity of the project with other phases of
development and the cumulative impact from the project as a whole.
The court rejected a finding of connectivity because each phase had
"independent utility" and could be substantially justified without ref-
erence to other phases.'3 6 Notably, the court did not attempt to assert
that the phased project would not cause cumulative impacts, or that
the phases would not cause impacts on the same geographical area. By
way of explanation, the court stated that it was unwilling to "require
the government to do the impractical."' 37
The most surprising aspect of the Wetlands Action decision is the
manner in which the court avoided NEPA cumulative impact regula-
tions and Ninth Circuit precedent. Essentially, the court rejected the
cumulative impact challenge by distinguishing the Blue Mountains
situation on the grounds that the projects in that case could have met
the connectivity test. 38  However, the court's analysis is incorrect.
Even under NEPA, project based analysis should not be used to re-
133. Id. at 811 (citing City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. United States Dep't of Transp., 123
F.3d 1142, 1160 (9th Cir. 1997)).
134. 222 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000).
135. Id. at 1115 (quoting Sylvester v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 884 F.2d 394, 398 (9th
Cir.1989)).
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place cumulative impact analysis, thereby relieving the agency of fur-
ther environmental review.139 Indeed, although the project connec-
tivity analysis and cumulative impact analysis are grounded in differ-
ent assumptions, the two need not conflict.
V. PRACTICAL DILEMMA?
Washington courts have struggled to reconcile their reading of
permissible phased review with the requirement that agencies analyze
probable cumulative impacts. At least in theory, the court is author-
ized to order comprehensive, cumulative and supplemental environ-
mental review for project proposals. The court's order can take the
form of a new threshold determination,1 40 an order for preparation of
an environmental impact statement, or some form of a supplemental
study, 141 including use of an addendum. 42 Unfortunately, the exis-
tence of authority does not an argument make. The piecemeal prob-
lem clearly does not arise from lack of judicial or regulatory authority.
Therefore, although it is easy to read the case law to indicate an inabil-
ity to formulate a workable, consistent rule delineating piecemealed
from properly phased review, it is more likely that the rule evades
crystallization due to the practical concerns implicated by a piecemeal
challenge.
The piecemeal loophole may be problematic simply because the
practice is so easily identified, but infrequently corrected. One need
not receive advanced training, pour over technical manuals, or achieve
some sort of scientific expertise to identify an improperly piecemealed
study. However, when a single project application is presented to a
hearing examiner, council, commission, or court, common sense seems
to dictate that a cumulative impact study would impose dispropor-
tionately burdensome duties far exceeding the boundaries of the appli-
cation at hand.' This is the practical problem courts face in enforc-
ing SEPA obligations: there are no defined limits to the potential
cumulative impacts from a given proposal. In theory, impacts from
past, present and reasonably foreseeable future projects can extend in-
definitely into both the past and future. Similarly, the shared or com-
139. See Thatcher, supra note 84, at 632-33.
140. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-340(3) (2001).
141. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-620 (2001).
142. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-625(2001).
143. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Judicial Enforcement of NEPA-Inspired Promises, 20
ENVTL. L. 569, 608-09 (1990) (discussing the problem of agency as 'reluctant regulator,' and
concluding that effective NEPA enforcement might only be possible through "innovative use of
statutes other than NEPA that empower agencies to act.").
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bined impacts a proposal may have with other present projects is in-
distinct as a geographical matter.
Therefore, the real problem for local environmental reviewers
may be the lack of proportionality between the size of a development
project and the cost of studying the probable impacts from that pro-
ject. Few hearings examiners, council members, or superior courts
want to be responsible for forcing the proponents of a small subdivi-
sion to analyze the environmental impacts caused by physical and
planning changes over ten years of development through a particular
traffic corridor. In such circumstances, the project is reviewed on an
individual and isolated basis, and agencies in good conscience can ap-
prove construction based on a finding that the proposed construction
will not have a significant, adverse environmental impact.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit court in Wetlands Action rejected the
piecemeal challenge because it was unwilling to "require the govern-
ment to do the impractical." '144 The court's reluctance is reminiscent
of the Supreme Court's holding in Kleppe v. Sierra Club4 ' dismissing
the need for a cumulative impact study for a slew of locationally
linked, coal related projects. After noting that the cumulative impact
challenge was unsupported by the evidence, the Kleppe Court stated
that "[e]ven if environmental interrelationships could be shown con-
clusively to extend across basins and drainage areas, practical consid-
erations necessitate restricting the scope of comprehensive state-
ments."' 46  The Court, however, did not define the boundaries of
practicality.
Possibly, the Wetlands Action decision and Kleppe dictum create
a new standard of judicial review: if comprehensive environmental re-
view is "impractical," the court is authorized to craft an exception to
the informational goals of SEPA and NEPA. Indeed, the Wetlands
Action court appeared particularly influenced by the size of each
phase: Phase I alone boasted development of 600 acres, five million
feet of office space, and 13,000 units of hotel and retail space.' 47 Al-
though an environmental study that combined review of Phases I and
II would significantly advance understanding of the environmental
needs in the Wetlands Action location, a study of that scope is also fi-
nancially significant. A claim to impracticality is a very powerful
position.
144. Wetlands Action Network v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 222 F.3d 1105,
1119 (9th Cir. 2000).
145. 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
146. Id. at 413-14.
147. Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1118.
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The SEPA statutory scheme directly confronts the "practicality"
argument. The Washington State Legislature declared that "it is the
continuing responsibility of... agencies of the state to use all practi-
cable means" to effectuate the goals of SEPA.'48 The legislature also
declared that SEPA should be complied with "to the fullest extent
possible."' 49  On its face, such language could be read to support a
practicality ceiling on SEPA compliance. However, the standard for
an agency's authority to forego impact analysis is high.
Subsequently, the Department of Ecology precluded the practi-
cality argument by indicating that the information relating to envi-
ronmental impacts may only be ignored where the costs of gaining
such information are "exorbitant," or the means of gathering the in-
formation "are speculative or not known."' 0  The Department of
Ecology has further mandated that, if uncertainty is unavoidable, "the
agency shall weigh the need for the action with the severity of possible
impacts which would occur if the agency were to decide to proceed in
the face of uncertainty."'' Faced with the defendant's argument of
increased project costs, the Merkel court held that despite the incon-
venience incurred in a comprehensive environmental study, "these in-
conveniences are far outweighed by the public's interest in attaining
and maintaining an environment consistent with legislatively promul-
gated goals."' 2
Washington courts have not blatantly disregarded this prohibi-
tion, perhaps due to precedent or from the obvious and inevitable
regulatory dilemma that would be caused.' Nonetheless, the practi-
cality issue occasionally appears in judicial inquiries into the policies
of SEPA. In City of Bellevue v. King County Boundary Review
Board,'54 the Washington Supreme Court affirmed a SEPA enforce-
ment against an annexation decision. However, Judge Hamilton,
joined by Judges Hicks and Rosellin, dissented from the majority be-
cause of practical considerations in SEPA enforcement. To the dis-
senters, "subjecting simple actions, such as annexation, to SEPA
clearly will result in stagnation of responsible growth and develop-
ment."' 5 Fortunately, the dissenter's fears have yet been unrealized.
148. WASH. REV. CODE§ 43.21C.020 (2000).
149. WASH. REV. CODE§ 43.21C.030.
150. WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 197-11-080(1)-(3) (2001).
151. Id. 197-11-(3)(b).
152. Merkel v. Port of Brownsville, 8 Wash. App. 844, 851-52, 509 P.2d 390, 395 (1973).
153. But see Concerned Taxpayers Opposed to Modified Mid-S. Sequim Bypass v. Dep't
of Transp., 90 Wash. App. 225, 231, 951 P.2d 812, 816 (1998) (applying a "flexible cost-
effectiveness standard" to dismiss an otherwise misconceived piecemeal challenge).
154. 90 Wash.2d 856, 586 P.2d 470 (1978).
155. Id. at 871.
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However, the dissent went further in the attempt to mandate new pol-
icy for SEPA, stating that "[a]s a practical matter, requiring threshold
determinations at such an early stage will create additional and ex-
tended litigation driving up the costs of worthy and needed pro-
jects. '156
The City of Bellevue majority rejected the practicality argument.
The majority cited to the "pervasive impact"1"7 of the SEPA regula-
tory scheme, which requires an "independent and comprehensive as-
sessment of environmental factors"' 8 and "overlays" '159 other statutory
requirements. Interestingly, neither the majority nor the dissent dis-
cussed the relation between practicality and the SEPA purpose of en-
suring informed (and sometimes expensive) agency action. One thing
is clear: had the City of Bellevue dissent carried the day, SEPA would
impose significantly less effective responsibilities on state and local
agencies. Agencies could perform a cost/benefit assessment to deter-
mine whether SEPA would, in those circumstances and under those
conditions, require environmental study at all.
VI. SOLUTION-SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STUDIES
The thrust of my argument has been that cumulative environ-
mental impacts are often overlooked both at the agency level and in
the courts despite the seemingly comprehensive SEPA requirements.
A possible solution to this problem is supplemental environmental re-
view. After a plan has been implemented or a project constructed, the
actual environmental impacts become clear. 6 ' At such time, any ob-
jective onlooker can deduce discrepancies between the projected and
actual environmental impacts. A court can then compare the accuracy
of the environmental study versus the actuality of the project.' Cer-
tainly, post- implementation and post-construction environmental re-
view could further the SEPA promise of disclosure and accurate in-
formation. However, the question is whether such responsibilities will
be enforced by agencies and courts.'62 The answer is maybe.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 866.
158. Id. at 868.
159. Id. at 865.
160. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 197-11-330(2)(b) (2001).
161. See Currens v. Sleek, 138 Wash. 2d 858, 868, 983 P.2d 626 (1999) (finding that pro-
jected construction impacts in a surface water trespass action were improperly considered in the
threshold determination when viewed in light of the impacts of the project after construction).
162. See Note, EIS Supplements for Improperly Completed Projects: A Logical Extension of
Judicial Review Under NEPA, 81 MICH. L. REV. 221, 229-30 (1982) (arguing that "the percep-
tion that the filing of the original EIS concludes the agency's responsibility to consider environ-
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SEPA does not require further impact review if the probable sig-
nificant adverse impacts were covered in prior environmental determi-
nations.63 Nonetheless, SEPA regulations clearly contemplate situa-
tions where supplemental study is appropriate. Washington courts
have repeatedly stated that supplemental environmental impact stud-
ies may be a means to cure deficient studies." 4 The court in Cathcart-
Maltby- Clearview held that, although a comprehensive cumulative
impact study was premature at the planning stage, "[a]s the data be-
comes available or, at the latest, when sector plan approval is sought,
the secondary and cumulative impacts on the entire affected area...
must be quantitatively assessed and the costs of mitigating them iden-
tified.""16 The court's holding has intuitive appeal. Reliable informa-
tion regarding the probable, significant adverse environmental impacts
becomes available over time and with the initiation of new projects.
An accurate understanding of the adverse environmental impacts from
construction cannot possibly be indefinitely speculative. Unfortu-
nately, not a single court has enforced such a deferred mandate,166 and
the status and effect of the Cathcart-Maltby- Clearview reasoning re-
mains something of a mystery.
In the federal context, NEPA case law suggests that subsequent,
supplemental environmental review is entirely appropriate and feasi-
ble. This issue was addressed by the First Circuit in DuBois v. United
mental values restores the pre-NEPA status quo"); William L. Andreen, In Pursuit of NEPA's
Promise: The Role of Executive Oversight in the Implementation of Environmental Policy, 64 IND.
L.J. 205, 247-48 (1989) (arguing that a supplemental study may be necessary because "the entire
efficacy of the EIS process is called into question when changes are made to a project after the
publication of a final impact statement").
163. See Nisqually Delta Ass'n v. City of DuPont, 103 Wash. 2d 720, 696 P.2d 1222
(1985).
164. Org. to Preserve Agric. Lands v. Adams County, 128 Wash. 2d 869, 880, 913 P.2d
793, 800 (1996) (holding that greater detail in environmental impact analysis can be required at
subsequent phases in phased review); Ullock v. City of Bremerton, 17 Wash. App. 573, 583, 565
P.2d 1179 (1977) (holding that the City would be required to make a more comprehensive envi-
ronmental impact analysis at the permit stage); Greenpeace v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 55 F.
Supp.2d 1248, 1273-74 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (holding that a supplemental impact study required
where successive changes each had negligible impacts, but the cumulative impacts had never
been studied).
165. Cathcart-Maltby-Clearview Cmty. Council v, Snohomish County, 96 Wash. 2d 201,
209-12, 634 P.2d 853, 858-60 (1981).
166. Although no reported cases discuss the Cathcart-Maltby-Clearview scenario, courts
have considered challenges to the adequacy of environmental studies based on "new informa-
tion." Such challenges have not been very successful. See, e.g., Wells v. Whatcom County, 105
Wash. App. 143, 153, 19 P.3d 453, 458 (2001) (suggesting that the failure to previously chal-
lenge the action would bar later new information challenge and finding that "there must either be
a substantial change in the proposal, approval of which would likely have new significant adverse
impacts, or an impact previously identified as needing further evaluation.").
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States Department of Agriculture,'67 where the court declared that the
adoption of a prior EIS was a failure to perform supplemental envi-
ronmental impact studies and, therefore, arbitrary and capricious.
The court reversed the adoption because the proposed action had un-
dergone change, and aspects of the newly considered action had not
been considered in conjunction with other functions of the environ-
mental impact statement. The court was persuaded by the regulatory
language of NEPA: an agency "shall" prepare a supplemental EIS if
the agency makes substantial changes to the proposed action which
have a significant effect on the environment. 68 The court found that
"use of the word 'shall' here is mandatory, not precatory. It creates a
duty on the part of the agency to prepare a supplemental EIS if sub-
stantial changes are relevant to environmental concerns.'
169
Federal courts have also ordered agencies to supplement envi-
ronmental review in order to cure ignorance of the cumulative impacts
of successive amendments to non-project proposals. This response is
consistent with federal courts' focus on the dangers of piecemealing at
subsequent stages of development. 7 ° In Greenpeace v. National Ma-
rine Fisheries Service,171 a federal district court specifically dealt with
the problem of successive amendments to a regulatory scheme in
which each piece was individually determined not to have a significant
impact. Considering the original regulation together with changes, the
cumulative impact had not gone unstudied. The Greenpeace court
succinctly stated that "NEPA does not permit [an agency] to continue
making individually minor but collectively significant changes...
without preparing an SEIS analyzing these changes."' 72  The court
held that a supplemental study was the proper means to comply with
NEPA where successive additions to a proposal occurred over a sig-
nificant period of time. The court speculated that such changes could
combine to cause a significant cumulative impact and held that the
unstudied possibility of such impact should be analyzed.'73
167. 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996)
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1292.
170. See, e.g., Swain v. Brinegar, 542 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1976) (invalidating an EIS where
only the immediate impacts of a fifteen-mile stretch of road were studied, but where the appro-
priate study scope was forty-two miles of highway); Named Individual Members of San Antonio
Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding that frag-
menting highway study into three parts, rendering outside portions exempt because not a "major
federal action" violated prohibition on piecemealing).
171. 55 F. Supp.2d 1248 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
172. Id. at 1273-74.
173. Id.
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The federal courts in Dubois and Greenpeace demonstrate that
piecemealed review can be effectively corrected. Requiring supple-
mental review could alleviate the problems of speculation about im-
pacts in earlier phases and, in later phases, would vindicate the plain-
tiffs concerns (and court's promise) in Cathcart-Maltby- Clearview.
Furthermore, although such a requirement might not neutralize the
practicality concerns that seem to underlie judicial understanding of
piecemealing, a supplementary environmental review requirement
might be a justifiable cost of allowing a piecemealed project to pro-
ceed.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is not contentious to say that, in the short history of United
States environmental law, few legislative acts have been drafted with
such skill and foresight as to predict all misuses. Legislative drafters
often overlook the dreaded (or sought after) "loopholes" created by
statutory language that allow inventive, meticulous attorneys to find
and widen gaps in regulatory schemes. Loopholes, it is assumed, hin-
der the effectiveness of a good idea. The piecemeal loophole distin-
guishes itself because it arises as a matter of circumstance: the loop-
hole is used by agencies and confirmed by courts against clear
prohibitions where economic and timing concerns suggest their own
influence on the court's reasoning. As such, piecemealing might be
best categorized as a de facto loophole and simply left alone.
The basic structure of SEPA implies that the existence and sig-
nificance of adverse environmental impacts are guiding factors in de-
termining whether the statute imposes significant procedural obliga-
tions. Common sense dictates that the inquiry into adverse impacts
should focus on whether the impacts from one project will be exacer-
bated by, affected by, or will affect the impacts from another project.
However, where courts have cited the project connectedness or phased
review rules, awareness of cumulative impacts ends up lacking. The
court's understanding of project connectedness and phasing funda-
mentally alters the informational purposes of SEPA and is contrary to
a common sense reading. Yet, it occasionally surfaces in judicial re-
view of piecemeal challenges.
Luckily, Washington courts appear amenable to the notion of us-
ing supplemental impact studies to cure cumulative impact ignorance.
Will these promises be enforced? It is difficult to say, particularly in
the absence of a single Washington case enforcing Cathcart-Maltby-
Clearview, which mandated a reexamination of environmental impacts
after a development had time to progress and permit a more efficient
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and economic determination. SEPA goals and mandates provide a
solid basis for implementing the Cathcart-Maltby-Clearview promise.
Moreover, if the Washington courts do not take seriously the effect of
ignoring cumulative impacts, we may find ourselves in the precise
situation SEPA was designed to avoid: waking up in a permanently al-
tered world without having noticed the piecemeal changes and unable
to live with the result.
